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“We’ve done a lot of things we’re not proud of.
Robbing graves, plundering tombs, double
parking. But, nobody got hurt. Well, maybe
somebody got hurt, but nobody we knew.”
– Vinny Santorini, Atlantis: The Lost Empire
1 Introduction
Collective action problems are pervasive in everyday life. They arise whenever the efforts
of two or more individuals are needed to achieve an outcome (Sandler, 2004). Their very
nature depends on the fact that the social cost (resp. benefit) of an action is not equal to
the corresponding private cost (resp. benefit). Individuals fail to internalize the social effect
of their actions and the final result is a suboptimal allocation of resources. In a complex
world, collective action failures becomes more of an issue and various solutions have emerged
through time. The emergence of state has been associated with the inability of individuals
to coordinate their actions towards Pareto improving allocations (see for example Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980; Skaperdas, 2003). On the other hand a number of scholars emphasize
the role of the market (e.g., Coase, 1960) or the role of social conventions, ideology and
tradition (e.g., North, 1981) in solving problems created by externalities. For example, (Katz
and Rosen, 1991, pp. 611) explain that “[. . . ] certain social conventions can be viewed as
attempts to force people to take into account the externalities that they generate.” Similarly,
North (1981, pp. 53) suggests that: “Its fundamental aim [of ideology] is to energize groups
to behave contrary to a simple, hedonistic, individual calculus of costs and benefits. This is
the central thrust of major ideologies.”
In the present paper we seek to examine the effect of political ideology on collective action
problems. More specifically, we investigate the effect of personal political beliefs on double
parking behavior based on a field survey that was carried out in September and October
2012 at one of the main streets of the city of Ioannina in Greece. To our understanding,
double parking (i.e., parking parallel to a car that is already parked at the curb) constitutes
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a fairly standard type of negative externality. This is because drivers that choose to double
park ensure for themselves a direct benefit in terms of time (looking for a free parking place
usually implies waste of time) by transferring the cost to the rest of the members of the
society. This is because increased traffic that comes as a result of double parking, implies
waste of time for all the other drivers. Therefore, in the absence of punishment, the social
cost from double parking is higher than the private cost faced by the violator. We note
that the city of Ioannina consists an ideal place for our field survey mainly because tickets
for double parking are seldom issued and therefore double parking is pervasive to such an
extent that is considered as an ‘almost legal’ behavior by the local drivers. However, at the
same time every local driver is aware that this behavior implies a social cost due to increased
traffic.
There are only a few studies highlighting the importance of ideology and personal polit-
ical beliefs in order to address collective action problems (Anderson et al., 2005; Mestelman
and Feeny, 1988). Mestelman and Feeny (1988) suggest that incentives to free ride are easier
to overcome when individuals share common beliefs about the need for cooperation and they
are aware that individually rational behavior could lead to suboptimal outcomes compared
to the cooperative one. Moreover, one could expect individuals characterized by ideologies
that favor state intervention to rely heavier on state actions in order to address collective
action problems.1 These agents are expected to shape their behavior mostly according to in-
centives and constraints provided by the law and the corresponding monitoring/punishment
mechanisms of the state. In contrast, individuals that believe in the superiority of decen-
tralized, market solutions are expected to shape their behavior mostly according to internal
incentives, social conventions and moral responsibility. Focusing on the example of double
parking behavior, the latter group of agents is expected to abstain from double parking even
in the absence of an effective policing mechanism.
We now turn to a short preview of our basic findings. Our field survey was carried
1Similarly, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) employing General Social Survey (GSS) data, provide evidence
that ideology affects the preferences for redistribution even after controlling for individual income and edu-
cation levels.
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out in September and October 2012 at one of the main and busiest streets of the city of
Ioannina in Greece where 341 valid questionnaires were filled in. The interviewer (i.e., one
of the authors) approached each participant and invited him/her to participate voluntarily
in a short questionnaire about his/her driving and parking attitudes. At the same time,
as the interviews took place in the city center during rush hour, the interviewer observed
actual double parking behavior by some of the respondents. First, we asked subjects to
report frequency of double parking of their car on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘never’
to ‘always’. Moreover, in order to measure political ideology we adopted a [0-10] political
spectrum (with higher values denoting more extreme right-wing preferences) and we asked
subjects to indicate where they place themselves on this scale.2
Our results provide evidence that personal political beliefs affect individuals’ parking
behavior. More specifically, our analysis suggests that subjects placing themselves either on
the extreme Left or the extreme Right on the [0-10] political spectrum, are characterized by
increased propensity of double parking behavior. Moreover, we find strong gender effects on
double parking (since females are less likely to double park as compared to males). Finally,
we verify that personal beliefs about the worthiness of traffic education exert a statistically
significant effect on individuals’ parking behavior.
In order to relate individuals’ positions on the [0-10] political spectrum with specific
preferences concerning state intervention policies, we follow Gemenis and Nezi (2012) that
compose a dataset on the ideological and policy positions of twelve Greek political parties
based on an expert survey conducted close to the time period of our survey. Gemenis and
Nezi (2012) suggest that both the extreme Left and the extreme Right Greek parties are
strongly in favor of state intervention in the economy.3 In contrast, Greek parties located
on the center of the political spectrum are in favor of more liberal economic policies. Taking
this stylized fact into account, our empirical findings could be read as follows: Subjects
that believe in the superiority of state intervention (either when they are placing themselves
2This question was adopted from the European Social Survey.
3More details are provided in Section 2.
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on the extreme Right or on the extreme Left), rely heavier on incentives and constraints
provided by the law. Therefore in the absence of an effective monitoring mechanism they
fail to internalize the social cost of their actions. In contrast, agents that believe in the
superiority of the decentralized, market solutions mostly shape their behavior according to
social conventions and moral responsibility. They therefore take into account the social
impact of their actions even in the absence of a strong monitoring state mechanism.4
The rest of the paper proceeds along the following lines: in Section 2, we present the
structure of the political market in Greece at the time period close to our field survey. In
Section 3, we describe our survey in detail. In Section 4 we discuss the data and the empirical
results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main points of our analysis.
2 The political parties in Greece
At a time close to the execution of our field study, political market in Greece was char-
acterized by the presence of twelve basic political parties. In this section we present data
on the ideological and policy positions of the Greek political parties developed by Gemenis
and Nezi (2012). More specifically, Gemenis and Nezi (2012) composed a dataset of Greek
parties position based on expert surveys that elicited knowledge by 52 political scientists
with extensive knowledge of Greek Politics.5,6
Table 1 shows Greek parties’ positions on the Left-Right scale (Column 2) and their
agendas concerning the importance of state intervention on the economy (Column 3). Higher
4Our empirical results are also in line with a small but growing number of studies from the Political
Science and Political Psychology literature investigating potential common characteristics on the social
behavior of the extreme political poles. For example political extremism is found to be associated with
black and white thinking (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003), low trust outside the extremist ingroup (Hardin,
2002), higher belief in conspiracy theories (van Prooijen et al., 2015) and distrust in the way the state works
Inglehart (1987).
5Since the publication of the expert survey on parties’ Left-Right (L-R) positions by Castles and Mair
(1984), expert surveys have seen extensive use in political science, especially in a cross-national context (see
e.g., Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Kitschelt et al., 2009; O’Malley, 2007)
6The selection of experts was based on the directory of the Greek Political Science Association and a
Google Scholar search for authors publishing on Greek contemporary politics. Twenty five of the experts
that participated in the experts survey, were affiliated with higher education institutions in Greece, 24 with
institutions abroad, whereas three experts were affiliated with institutions both in Greece and abroad. For
more details concerning the methodology employed, see Gemenis and Nezi (2012).
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values on the Left-Right scale denote a more right-wing position of the corresponding party,
whereas higher values in the state-market policy position denote stronger preference for a
free market economy.
Table 1: Greek Parties’ mean scores in Left-Right ideological position and State-Market
policy position
Left-Right position State vs. Market position
ANTARSYA 1.67 1.32
KKE 1.91 1.12
SYRIZA 2.24 1.82
PRASINOI 3.39 3.75
DIMAR 3.76 3.41
ARMA 3.79 2.84
PASOK 5.35 6.06
DISY 6.39 8.42
DRASSI 6.39 9.39
ND 7.33 6.56
LAOS 8.45 5.55
CHRYSI AVGI 9.97 2.85
Notes: Data are drawn from the online dataset of Gemenis and Nezi (2012) available at https:
//easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:48574/tab/2.
A scatterplot of the data reported in Table 1 is shown in Figure 1, along with a quadratic
fit of the data. Figure 1 depicts a cluster of parties placed on the extreme Left, namely AN-
TARSYA, KKE and SYRIZA. It should be noted that ANTARSYA is an electoral coalition
of anti-capitalist extra-parliamentary groups, KKE is an orthodox communist party whereas
SYRIZA is an electoral coalition of Maoist, Trotskyist and other leftist parties (see Geme-
nis, 2010). Not surprisingly, these parties are extremely in favor of state intervention and
consequently are placed on the lower part of the state-market policy spectrum.
To the right of these three parties there is a cluster of parties composed by PRASINOI,
DIMAR and ARMA which are placed closer to the center of the Left-Right spectrum and
upper on the state-market policy spectrum. PASOK and ND are placed in the middle of the
graph, which reflects a placement close to the center for both the Left-Right spectrum as
well as the state-market policy spectrum. DISY and DRASSI are two small liberal parties
which are placed upper in the state-market policy spectrum than any other party. Finally,
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of state/market position with respect to Left-Right position of Greek
parties
Source: Data drawn from the online dataset of Gemenis and Nezi (2012) available at
https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:48574/tab/2
to the right of ND we find the radical right parties of LAOS and CHRYSI AVGI. Both of
them are characterized by agendas that are in favor of anti-immigration policies and give
particular emphasis on issues related to ‘law and order’ and nationalist foreign policy (see
Gemenis and Dinas, 2010; Gemenis and Nezi, 2012).
As can be easily verified by eyeballing Figure 1, both the extreme Left and the extreme
Right parties in Greece share common views concerning the importance of state intervention
on the economy. More specifically, ANTARSYA, KKE and SYRIZA are characterized by
agendas that strongly favor state intervention whereas at the same time the parties of the
extreme Right (i.e., LAOS and CHRYSI AVGI) also prefer state intervention compared to
liberal policies. In contrast, parties that are placed in the middle of the political spectrum
(i.e., PASOK, ND, DISY and DRASSI) are characterized by agendas that are more in favor
of free market policies.
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3 The survey
Our field survey was carried out in September and October 2012 at the main and busiest
street of the city of Ioannina in Northern Greece. The interviews were conducted by a
single interviewer (i.e., one of the authors). The interviewer approached each participant
and invited him/her to participate voluntarily in the survey. The survey was conducted
from Monday to Sunday during morning and afternoon hours. We approached 569 persons
and got 352 agreements to participate in the survey and 224 refusals. In total, we got 341
valid questionnaires (11 persons either terminated the interview early or were ineligible to
participate) resulting in a response rate of 61.9% and a co-operation rate of 59.9%.
Participants in the survey were one of three types: i) subjects that had just parked
his/her car parallel to a car already parked at the curb (i.e., double parked) b) subject that
had just normal parked his/her car c) subjects passing by on foot.7 Subjects that had just
parked their car were left walking for a minute before they get intercepted by the interviewer,
so that they don’t instantly relate their parking behavior with the aim of the survey.
The first question in the questionnaire was a filter question asking whether the subject
has a driving license and whether s/he drives a car (either regularly or occasionally). If
the answer was negative, the interview was terminated. In the case where the interviewer
intercepted a person that had just parked his/her car, this filter question also served as an
implicit statement of ignorance for the driving (and the parking) status of the respondent.
This way we minimized subjects being a priori suspicious about them being intercepted
to participate in the survey. Since our aim was to elicit how often subjects double-park,
we asked subjects to self-report their frequency of double-parking behavior. Therefore, we
asked subjects to indicate how often they double-park their car on a 5-point Likert scale with
7Although we strived to get equal representation of the three types of subjects, it wasn’t as easy given
that subjects that had normal parked their car had a slower turnaround to their car. In addition, those that
had just double parked their car were usually in a hurry to get back to their car as soon as possible, thus
they had less available time to participate in a survey. Consequently, we got larger representation of subjects
passing by on foot, then of subjects that double parked their car, followed by subjects that normally parked
their car.
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possible answers being “never”, “rarely”, “neither often, nor rarely”, “often” and “always”.8
To measure attitudes about traffic behavior, we also asked respondents to indicate how
important they think traffic education is on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “not important
at all” and “very important”. In addition, given that the self-reported double parking
behavior is subject to social-desirability bias (i.e., subjects may be inclined to state they
do not engage in such behavior because it is socially desirable not to) we used the social
desirability scale (SDS) of Sto¨ber (2001). The final instrument is composed of 16 questions
(e.g., “I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences”, “I
occasionally speak badly of others behind their back” etc.). Subjects are asked to state their
level of agreement with each of the statements. The statements are then individually scored
and summed to form a single index of social desirability. The more a person tends to agree
with the statements on the SDS, the more likely it is s/he falls prey to social desirability
bias (and potentially understate frequency of double parking).
To measure political ideology we adopted a question used in the European Social Survey
(ESS) that asks subjects to indicate where they place themselves politically in a scale where 0
means the left and 10 means the right. Naturally, not all people felt comfortable stating their
political views so 17 subjects refused to indicate any. Some additional questions adopted
from ESS were attitudes regarding whether the person thinks that most people would try
to take advantage of him/her if they got the chance, or if they would try to be fair (5-
point Likert scale), how interested the subject is in politics (5-point Likert scale anchored by
“not at all” and “very much”) and whether the subject thinks s/he would participate in a
political or action group (possible answers being “definitely no”, “probably no”, “probably
yes”, “definitely yes”).
Standard demographic data were also collected at the end of the questionnaire including
gender, household size, education level and income. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for
key variables of our survey.
8In the analysis the “often” and “always” categories were merged, given the low number of responses in
the “always” category
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Variable description Mean S.D.
dpark
Dummy, Never double parks 0.225
Dummy, Rarely double parks 0.469
Dummy, Medium double parks 0.182
Dummy, Often/always double parks 0.123
Political ideology Political ideology (0 to 10 scale) 4.849 2.595
Political ideology (devia-
tions from the center)
Political ideology (deviations from the center) 1.985 1.676
Status1 Dummy, subject double parked 0.509
Status2 Dummy, subject was passing by 0.324
Status3 Dummy, subject normal parked 0.167
Gender Dummy, Female 0.441
hsize Household size 3.500 1.275
Educ1 Dummy, Up to junior high-school 0.077
Educ2 Dummy, Up to senior high-school 0.191
Educ3 Dummy, Some college or university student 0.151
Educ4 Dummy, University graduate 0.454
Educ5 Dummy, Post-graduate studies 0.127
Income1 Dummy, household income is 0-5.000 0.059
Income2 Dummy, household income is 5.000-10.000 0.130
Income3 Dummy, household income is 10.000-20.000 0.287
Income4 Dummy, household income is 20.000-50.000 0.448
Income5 Dummy, household income is 50.000-100.000 0.059
Income6 Dummy, household income is >100.000 0.019
Traffic education1 Dummy, Traffic education is medium or less important 0.059
Traffic education2 Dummy, Traffic education is important 0.222
Traffic education3 Dummy, Traffic education is very important 0.719
Political Participation1 Dummy, would definitely not participate in political
group
0.272
Political Participation2 Dummy, would not participate in political group 0.265
Political Participation3 Dummy, would participate in political group 0.309
Political Participation4 Dummy, would definitely participate in political group 0.154
Political Interest1 Dummy, not at all interested in politics 0.136
Political Interest2 Dummy, little interest in politics 0.111
Political Interest3 Dummy, medium interested in politics 0.185
Political Interest4 Dummy, interested in politics 0.306
Political Interest5 Dummy, very much interested in politics 0.262
SDS Social Desirability Scale 59.265 7.403
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4 Results
4.1 A first look at the data
Before presenting our results, it’s worth scrutinizing our data for some first insights. As
mentioned above, data for this survey were collected from 341 subjects randomly intercepted
in the main street of Ioannina. Unfortunately, 17 persons refused to identify their political
ideology and rendered their responses useless. A question that might arise is whether these
17 respondents have a different socio-demographic profile than subjects that answered the
political ideology question and thus our survey suffers from selection effects with respect to
answering one of our main questions of interest i.e., political ideology.
Some tests indicate this is not the case for gender (Pearson’s χ2 = 2.76, p-value=0.097),
household size (p-value for Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test=0.520), education (Fisher’s exact
test p-value=0.059) and income (Fisher’s exact test p-value=0.625). In addition, respondents
were observed in one of three statuses: passing-by on foot, had just double parked or had
just normal parked. A Fisher’s exact test indicates that non-responding to the political
ideology question was not related to observed status (p-value=0.710). Finally, the social
desirability scale was not different between responders and non-responders to the political
ideology question (p-value for Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test=0.910).
However, when we test for differences in political attitudes (i.e., whether subject would
participate in a political or action group, or how interested the subject is in politics) we
find significant differences (Fisher’s exact test p-value=0.001 for both political attitudes)
between responders and non-responders to the political ideology question. If one observes
the pattern of responses, it is obvious that those not responded to the political ideology
question were people that would not participate in a political/action group or people that
were not interested in politics.
Another question that might arise is whether political ideology is related to observed
status of subjects (i.e., passing-by on foot, had just double parked or had just normal parked).
A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates this is not the case (χ2 = 0.697, p-value=0.706). Note, that
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observed status is not the same as self-reported frequency of double-parking behavior since
the former is a single-shot observed behavior while the latter refers to how the responded
generally (or repeatedly in his day-life) behaves with respect to parking. These are, however,
positively correlated (polychoric correlation coefficient ρ=0.54, s.e.=0.087).
To get a first insight about the relation of political ideology and self-reported double
parking behavior, the left part of Figure 2 graphs the percentages of self-reported frequency
of double parking behavior (as percentages of the total in each category) across the domain
of the political ideology scale. If one observes closely, subjects that self-report to double park
often or always exhibit the highest percentages at the two extremes of the political ideology
scale (left wing and right wing). To get a better look at this relationship we formed another
measure of political ideology by taking deviations from the center. This measure of political
ideology groups together subjects at political polars. The right part of Figure 2 shows more
clearly that subjects at the extremes of the political ideology scale, form a higher percentage
of those that self-report to double-park often or always.
Figure 2: Political ideology and self-reported double parking behavior
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4.2 Regression results
To check whether insights from the descriptive analysis hold under the scrutiny of con-
ditional analysis, we estimated ordered logit regressions to account for the ordinal nature of
the dependent variable (frequency of double parking). Table 3 shows coefficient estimates
for several specifications. Model (1) uses as covariates the political ideology scale and several
demographics. Model (2) adds the social desirability scale to the list of covariates in order to
account for the potential of socially desirable answers. The political ideology variable is not
significant in any of these models. Models (3) and (4) are more complex versions of models
(1) and (2) with additional controls for political attitudes as well as attitudes toward traffic
education. Similar to models (1) and (2) the political ideology variable is not statistically
significant in models (3) and (4).
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Table 3: Ordered logit results (DV=double parking)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political ideology 0.054 (0.042) 0.037 (0.042) 0.048 (0.044) 0.038 (0.044)
Status2 -1.118
∗∗∗ (0.254) -1.077∗∗∗ (0.256) -1.239∗∗∗ (0.262) -1.196∗∗∗ (0.263)
Status3 -1.568
∗∗∗ (0.342) -1.481∗∗∗ (0.346) -1.563∗∗∗ (0.349) -1.488∗∗∗ (0.352)
Female -0.739∗∗∗ (0.225) -0.760∗∗∗ (0.226) -0.760∗∗∗ (0.234) -0.792∗∗∗ (0.236)
Household size 0.099 (0.090) 0.103 (0.091) 0.016 (0.094) 0.026 (0.095)
Educ2 0.570 (0.454) 0.589 (0.458) 0.640 (0.477) 0.651 (0.477)
Educ3 0.350 (0.473) 0.221 (0.476) 0.268 (0.506) 0.168 (0.506)
Educ4 0.066 (0.421) 0.054 (0.423) 0.155 (0.444) 0.143 (0.444)
Educ5 -0.257 (0.503) -0.158 (0.507) 0.200 (0.537) 0.277 (0.538)
Income2 -0.269 (0.529) -0.288 (0.527) -0.126 (0.559) -0.163 (0.555)
Income3 -1.098
∗∗ (0.493) -1.147∗∗ (0.491) -1.018∗ (0.524) -1.077∗∗ (0.520)
Income4 -0.688 (0.478) -0.617 (0.476) -0.355 (0.515) -0.339 (0.510)
Income5 -0.921 (0.638) -0.889 (0.635) -0.745 (0.682) -0.752 (0.678)
Income6 1.135 (0.898) 1.235 (0.904) 1.068 (0.943) 1.149 (0.955)
SDS - - -0.054∗∗∗ (0.016) - - -0.043∗∗∗ (0.016)
Traffic Education2 - - - - -0.342 (0.570) -0.149 (0.569)
Traffic Education3 - - - - -1.831
∗∗∗ (0.546) -1.574∗∗∗ (0.548)
Political Participation2 - - - - -0.200 (0.331) -0.211 (0.331)
Political Participation3 - - - - -0.394 (0.333) -0.389 (0.334)
Political Participation4 - - - - -0.319 (0.411) -0.403 (0.412)
Political Interest2 - - - - -0.023 (0.466) 0.046 (0.466)
Political Interest3 - - - - -0.014 (0.433) 0.021 (0.433)
Political Interest4 - - - - -0.427 (0.426) -0.407 (0.425)
Political Interest5 - - - - 0.198 (0.433) 0.268 (0.434)
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τ1 -2.536
∗∗∗ (0.717) -5.838∗∗∗ (1.207) -4.476∗∗∗ (0.940) -6.808∗∗∗ (1.296)
τ2 -0.092 (0.698) -3.337
∗∗∗ (1.174) -1.814∗∗ (0.908) -4.112∗∗∗ (1.259)
τ3 1.235
∗ (0.705) -1.975∗ (1.167) -0.351 (0.903) -2.624∗∗ (1.246)
N 324.000 324.000 324.000 324.000
Log-likelihood -370.833 -364.933 -350.582 -347.094
AIC 775.667 765.866 753.164 748.187
BIC 839.939 833.920 851.463 850.267
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 2 supports the insight that people at the extremes of the political ideology scale
can be treated as a single group that behaves differently from people at the center. Thus, in
Table 4 we show coefficients estimates from ordered logit regressions where we replaced the
political ideology scale with an alternative scale that measures deviations from the center
of the political ideology scale. We’ve estimated several specifications with and without the
social desirability scale variable, as well as with and without additional attitudinal variables.
Results are fairly robust across specifications and show a positive and statistically significant
effect of political ideology (as we move from the center to political extremes) on the likelihood
of double parking.
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Table 4: Ordered logit results (DV=double park-
ing)/deviations from the center
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political ideology 0.142∗∗ (0.066) 0.112∗ (0.067) 0.208∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.073)
Status2 -1.101
∗∗∗ (0.255) -1.063∗∗∗ (0.256) -1.238∗∗∗ (0.263) -1.200∗∗∗ (0.264)
Status3 -1.589
∗∗∗ (0.342) -1.497∗∗∗ (0.346) -1.600∗∗∗ (0.349) -1.531∗∗∗ (0.353)
Female -0.690∗∗∗ (0.226) -0.717∗∗∗ (0.227) -0.747∗∗∗ (0.235) -0.779∗∗∗ (0.236)
Household size 0.105 (0.090) 0.108 (0.091) 0.014 (0.095) 0.022 (0.095)
Educ2 0.723 (0.459) 0.710 (0.462) 0.811
∗ (0.481) 0.802∗ (0.480)
Educ3 0.558 (0.485) 0.386 (0.487) 0.493 (0.516) 0.374 (0.517)
Educ4 0.217 (0.428) 0.177 (0.430) 0.343 (0.452) 0.317 (0.451)
Educ5 -0.136 (0.503) -0.070 (0.506) 0.361 (0.539) 0.409 (0.539)
Income2 -0.219 (0.531) -0.250 (0.529) -0.042 (0.559) -0.089 (0.555)
Income3 -1.060
∗∗ (0.496) -1.114∗∗ (0.494) -0.960∗ (0.525) -1.014∗ (0.520)
Income4 -0.601 (0.480) -0.556 (0.478) -0.255 (0.513) -0.248 (0.508)
Income5 -0.880 (0.638) -0.865 (0.637) -0.655 (0.684) -0.669 (0.681)
Income6 1.330 (0.909) 1.394 (0.914) 1.331 (0.964) 1.377 (0.971)
SDS - - -0.052∗∗∗ (0.016) - - -0.040∗∗ (0.017)
Traffic Education2 - - - - -0.092 (0.565) 0.059 (0.566)
Traffic Education3 - - - - -1.680
∗∗∗ (0.538) -1.463∗∗∗ (0.542)
Political Participation2 - - - - -0.117 (0.333) -0.137 (0.332)
Political Participation3 - - - -0.445 (0.336) -0.442 (0.337)
Political Participation4 - - - -0.607 (0.427) -0.662 (0.427)
Political Interest2 - - - - 0.007 (0.464) 0.065 (0.466)
Political Interest3 - - - - -0.031 (0.435) -0.003 (0.435)
Political Interest4 - - - - -0.506 (0.428) -0.487 (0.428)
Political Interest5 - - - - 0.167 (0.432) 0.231 (0.433)
τ1 -2.276
∗∗∗ (0.732) -5.480∗∗∗ (1.226) -3.979∗∗∗ (0.938) -6.199∗∗∗ (1.314)
τ2 0.183 (0.717) -2.970
∗∗ (1.197) -1.269 (0.912) -3.461∗∗∗ (1.282)
τ3 1.514
∗∗ (0.725) -1.602 (1.190) 0.212 (0.909) -1.958 (1.272)
N 324.000 324.000 324.000 324.000
Log-likelihood -369.334 -363.890 -346.974 -344.018
AIC 772.668 763.781 745.948 742.036
BIC 836.940 831.834 844.247 844.116
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Given that coefficients estimates from an ordered logit model are meaningless for quanti-
tative interpretation, Table 5 exhibits marginal effects (for continuous variables) and discrete
changes (for dummy variables) for model (4) of Table 4.9. Results show that a one point
increase on the political ideology scale results to a 1.6% increase in the likelihood of someone
stating s/he double parks often or always. In other words, those at the political extremes
have a 7.5% higher chance of stating they are more likely to double park often or always
as compared to people on the center of the political ideology scale. Conversely, they have
a 12.5% lower chance of stating they never double park. This is equivalent to saying that
those at the center of the scale are 12.5% more likely to state they would never double park
as compared to those at political extremes.
9Model (4) is favored against all other models of Table 4 based on Akaike’s Information Criterion (shown
in Table 4) as well as likelihood ratio tests (Model (4) vs (3): LR χ2 = 5.68, p− value = 0.017, Model (4) vs
(2): LR χ2 = 42.36, p− value < 0.001, Model (4) vs (1): LR χ2 = 53.25, p− value < 0.001)
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Table 5: Marginal effects of frequency of double parking
for model (4) of Table 4
Never Rarely Medium Often/Always
cpolid -0.027∗∗∗ -0.002 0.014∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Status2 0.150
∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Status3 0.207
∗∗∗ 0.049∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030)
Female 0.114∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
Household size -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Educ2 -0.115 -0.010 0.058
∗ 0.066∗
(0.073) (0.017) (0.035) (0.037)
Educ3 -0.058 0.003 0.027 0.027
(0.081) (0.011) (0.038) (0.037)
Educ4 -0.049 0.003 0.023 0.023
(0.072) (0.011) (0.032) (0.030)
Educ5 -0.063 0.003 0.030 0.030
(0.084) (0.012) (0.039) (0.039)
Income2 0.011 0.005 -0.006 -0.009
(0.067) (0.030) (0.039) (0.057)
Income3 0.149
∗∗ 0.006 -0.074∗ -0.081
(0.067) (0.029) (0.038) (0.051)
Income4 0.031 0.011 -0.018 -0.024
(0.061) (0.027) (0.036) (0.052)
Income5 0.092 0.015 -0.049 -0.059
(0.094) (0.027) (0.050) (0.061)
Income6 -0.111 -0.144 0.065
∗ 0.190
(0.070) (0.119) (0.037) (0.152)
Traffic Education2 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.008
(0.044) (0.069) (0.033) (0.080)
Traffic Education3 0.179
∗∗∗ 0.082 -0.116∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗
(0.046) (0.066) (0.039) (0.073)
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Political Participation2 0.018 0.004 -0.010 -0.013
(0.044) (0.010) (0.023) (0.031)
Political Participation3 0.062 0.007 -0.031 -0.038
(0.047) (0.009) (0.024) (0.030)
Political Participation4 0.097 0.003 -0.046 -0.054
(0.064) (0.012) (0.030) (0.034)
Political Interest2 -0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.006
(0.064) (0.011) (0.034) (0.041)
Political Interest3 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.061) (0.008) (0.032) (0.038)
Political Interest4 0.074 -0.002 -0.035 -0.037
(0.063) (0.009) (0.031) (0.035)
Political Interest5 -0.031 -0.007 0.017 0.021
(0.059) (0.012) (0.031) (0.039)
SDS 0.006∗∗ 0.000 -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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With respect to the other variables of the model, subjects that were observed passing
by on foot before they were intercepted, were 11.3% less likely to state they often or always
double park. Similarly, subjects that had just normal parked their car were 12.9% less likely
to state they often or always double park. This is an indication that the observed status of
the respondent corresponded well with the self-reported measure of double parking behavior.
The SDS variable is in accordance with prior expectations. Subjects that scored higher on
this scale (i.e., are more likely to give socially desirable answers) had a lower chance of stating
they double park. More specifically, a 10-point increase in the SDS variable decreases the
chances of stating someone often or always double parks by 3% while increases the chances
of someone stating s/he never double parks by 6%.
With respect to the demographics variables, we find that females are more likely to state
they never double park by 11.6% as compared to males. Education level and income level do
not consistently affect self-reported double parking behavior. On the other hand, subjects
that stated that traffic education is very important are 14.6% less likely to double park often
or always. This result highlights the importance of traffic education as a means to reducing
delinquent behavior.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a field survey, with the aim to investigate the effect of political
attitudes on collective action problems such as double parking behavior.
Employing data from 341 valid questionnaires, our analysis suggests that individuals
placing themselves either on the extreme Left or the extreme Right on a [0-10] political
spectrum are characterized by increased propensity of double parking behavior.
According to our results, different ideological groups deal with collective action problems
in different ways. We have highlighted one particular channel, and in particular we have
shown that (left or right) extremist groups behave similarly in this respect. However it would
be interesting to examine whether this effect appears in other collective action problems
besides double parking behavior. Our explanation and the result that people that have
extreme ideologies tend to believe more to centralized solutions to collective action problems
has an additional implication. Extreme groups may be able to solve those problems more
effectively by centralizing authority and control to a single individual. This may explain
why extreme ideologies are typically associated with a single political leader who is able to
mobilize his followers.
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